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1The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) was 
signed into law in 1988, after five years of research 
across Indian Country. Tribes began offering high 
stakes bingo in the mid-1970s, as one component of 
tribal economic development enterprises, and the rapid 
rise in Indian bingo and other forms of gambling led 
to creation of the IGRA. Many observers unfamiliar 
with the complexities of tribal sovereignty—tribes’ 
inherent right to self-govern—believed that the IGRA 
gave gaming to tribes. In fact, the IGRA was developed 
in response to tribal gaming, and the policy reinforces 
the inherent nature of tribal sovereignty as expressed 
through tribes’ inherent rights to conduct gaming. The 
IGRA created three regulatory classes and also a national 
gaming commission, the National Indian Gaming 
Commission (NIGC). Class I is defined as traditional 
and ceremonial games, which do not require regulation. 
Class II includes bingo and other similar games, which 
are regulated by the tribe first and then the NGIC. Class 
III is casino-style gambling and is regulated at the tribal, 
state, and national levels. 
Throughout the 1980s, state anxieties about Indian 
casino gaming increased, and corporate casino owners 
teamed with states and with religious groups to try to 
stem the growth of Indian casino gaming. These tensions 
resulted in a call to study gambling, which manifested 
 ©2016 Center for Gaming Research
University Libraries • University of Nevada, Las Vegas
Number 37                     November 2016
Center for Gaming Research
Occasional Paper Series
University Libraries                 University of Nevada, Las Vegas 
Contextualizing Indian Gaming for the 
National Gambling Impact Study Commission
Laurie Arnold
ABSTRACT: This paper discusses the Indian Gaming Subcommittee of the National Gambling 
Impact Study Commission (NGISC). It illustrates the efforts tribes made to educate members of 
the NGISC about the positive impacts of Indian casino gaming, and it also highlights the resistance 
tribes faced from the NGISC. 
Keywords: National Indian Gaming Commission, Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, Indian casino 
gaming, tribal sovereignty
Preferred Citation: Laurie Arnold. “Contextualizing Indian Gaming for the National Gambling Impact Study 
Commission” Occasional Paper Series, 37.  Las Vegas: Center for Gaming Research, UNLV University Librar-
ies, 2016.   
Center for Gaming Research • University of Nevada, Las Vegas
2
in the National Gambling Impact Study Commission 
(NGISC).1 Congress approved the Act (S 104-169) in 
1996. The Act called for a comprehensive examination 
of social and economic impacts of gambling, corporate 
and state and tribal, across the United States, to 
interrogate whether gambling was more positive or more 
negative for the communities in which it was situated.2 
It took Congress nearly two years to agree upon the 
Commission’s goals, to determine who would serve on 
the Commission and how members would be selected. 
During those two years Congress consulted with 
experts in corporate gaming and government gaming—
including tribal gaming—as well as gaming opponents 
as it framed the work of the Commission. A previous 
study had been conducted in 1976, and the NGISC was 
charged with expanding upon that research.3 Legalized 
gambling had exploded in the intervening twenty years. 
In 1976, only two states had legalized gambling. In 1996 
only four states did not have some form of gambling.4 
Nine members served on the Commission, three 
each appointed by the President, the Speaker of the 
House of Representatives and the Majority Leader 
of the Senate.5 Only one of these commissioners, 
Robert Loescher (Tlingit), President of the Sealaska 
Corporation, had any familiarity with tribal sovereignty 
or tribal communities, and it is evident that Loescher 
and Native American individuals who participated in 
hearings before the Commission had a great deal of 
education to perform in order to foster comprehension 
of tribal sovereignty among the commissioners.6 In 
addition to Loescher, the Commission included: James 
Dobson president of the evangelical Focus on the Family 
ministry; Kay James, dean of the School of Government 
at Regent University; Paul Moore, M.D. of Mississippi, 
a friend of Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott; William 
Bible, chairman of the Nevada Gaming Control Board; 
Richard Leone, president of the Twentieth Century 
fund, a progressive think tank; Terrence Lanni, CEO 
and Chairman of the Board of MGM Grand, Inc.; Leo 
McCarthy, former lieutenant governor of California; 
and John Wilhelm, secretary-treasurer of the Hotel 
Employees and Restaurant Employees International 
Union, a 40,000-member organization primarily serving 
employees of Las Vegas hotels and casinos. Two of these 
commissioners, Dobson and James, were staunchly and 
publicly anti-gambling, and the corporate gambling 
interests were anti-Indian gaming, at times viciously. 
One appointee, Paul Moore, displayed no opinions or 
prior knowledge of the gambling industry, and was 
apparently recruited simply because of his friendship 
with the Senate Majority Leader. Critics on both sides 
of the gambling question charged the president and the 
Congressional leaders with loading the commission 
while advocates from both sides noted that impartial 
conclusions would be impossible as a result.7
In April of 1998, Loescher recommended formation 
of a subcommittee on Indian gaming. The complexities 
of tribal law, tribal sovereignty, and Indian gaming were 
far beyond the experience of the commissioners, and 
Loescher asserted that the Commission would operate 
more effectively if Indian gaming was a separate aspect 
within the study. As a result of Loescher’s efforts, Indian 
gaming was the only kind of gambling to have its own 
subcommittee.8 The Subcommittee on Indian Gambling 
was charged with examining “the impact of gambling 
upon Native American governments, families and 
communities.” Paul Moore, John Wilhelm, and Robert 
Loescher served on this subcommittee, Moore as Chair, 
and cultural anthropologist Katherine Spilde was hired 
as a policy analyst for the subcommittee.9
The subcommittee essentially wanted to learn what 
gaming had done for Indian Country and if the IGRA 
was working. The group held hearings where tribal 
leaders detailed the numerous positive impacts of Indian 
casino gaming. The Shoshone Bannock tribe wanted the 
subcommittee to know that “Gaming is the oldest form 
of recreation: the Shoshone and Bannock peoples have 
conducted traditional games since time immemorial. 
Hand games and traditional card games still take place 
on weekends at community lodges.”10  Harris Teo of 
the Yakama Indian Nation observed, “Indian gaming 
is governmental gaming…To paint a negative picture 
of Indian gaming is another attempt to undermine 
Indian self-determination and self-sufficiency.”11 
Tribes consistently discussed tribal sovereignty, which 
manifests as political sovereignty, cultural sovereignty, 
and economic sovereignty. 
When the NGISC began its research in 1996, Indian 
casino gambling was entering its second decade. That 
President Clinton included it as an area for research and 
the Commission’s creation of a subcommittee to more 
fully explore what Indian casino gambling meant for 
Native American communities and the communities 
around them is a testament both to the already-
significant economic revenues generated by Indian 
gaming and to American anxieties about Indian gaming. 
Moreover, tribes and the National Indian Gaming 
Association (NIGA) played a central role in making 
Indian gaming part of the larger study of gambling in 
America. Timothy Wapato (Colville), former Executive 
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Director of NIGA, reminded the Commission, “It was 
Indian Nations who first proposed examination of the 
relationship between gaming revenue and the [tribal 
actions related to] poverty and welfare…and whether 
other “alternative revenue systems” are available to 
[tribal] governments. The final version of the legislation 
created a Commission which was intended by Congress 
to fairly and equitably examine Indian gaming in proper 
relation to the more global issues the Commission was 
created to examine.”12
 More than one hundred tribal members from 
50 gaming tribes13 testified before the subcommittee, 
and the subcommittee consistently heard that Indian 
gaming was working, and that the IGRA was working. 
“Don’t destroy it;14 it means economic survival.”15 
Mark Fox, on behalf of the North Dakota Indian 
Gaming Association and the Three Affiliated Tribes 
of the Fort Berthold Nation (Mandan, Hidatsa, and 
Arikara Nation), discussed grave rates of poverty and 
unemployment on the North Dakota reservations. He 
noted that gaming had not wholly resolved these issues 
but had improved employment and somewhat reduced 
poverty.16  During another hearing, Clifton Pattea, 
President of the Fort McDowell Mohave-Apache Indian 
Community, reminded the subcommittee, “A few short 
years of revenue cannot reverse years of poverty, despair, 
and lack of quality education…[Our community] urges 
the Commission to find that Indian Governmental 
Gaming is positive and that it should be continued.”17
Cedro Gopsa of the Kickapoo Tribe of Texas 
indicated that gaming would be the only way this 
small and very poor tribe would begin to emerge from 
poverty. The tribe had won federal recognition in 1983, 
a long battle despite having a Peace Medal from George 
Washington recognizing them as American allies, but 
had no land base. The land base would provide homes 
and community, yes, but Gopsa intentionally focused 
the conversation on the inextricable connection 
between Kickapoo spirituality and homeland. Without 
a designated homeland, they had been prevented 
from worship, blocked from practicing their ancestral 
spiritualties. Gaming revenue would mean improved 
social services and education, but more importantly it 
represented the opportunity for cultural continuity.18 In 
response to Gopsa, Moore proclaimed, “I got my wish. I 
think we heard from some ‘po’ Indians.” Without irony 
and barely pausing for breath after hearing from an 
impoverished community, Moore then observed that 
the Commission’s most serious charge was to determine 
“how much is enough.” Throughout the day, Moore 
asked each participant what they thought of the term 
“rich Indian,” especially when he believed he had just 
heard testimony from one. Then he was thrilled to at 
last hear from “po’ Indians,” presumably because he 
found them more legitimate or credible than tribes who 
had won some economic successes through gambling.19
In fact, Moore misstated the Commission’s charge to 
determine “how much is enough.” In the authorizing 
legislation, Congress mandated the Commission 
“conduct a comprehensive legal and factual study of the 
social and economic impacts of gambling in the United 
States on Federal, State, local, and Native American 
tribal governments; and communities and social 
institutions generally.” The Act called for a report which 
summarized the research collected and which included 
recommendations of the Commission, but it did not 
authorize the Commission to limit growth of gaming or 
to identify ways to limit growth of gaming. Individual 
commissioners may have wanted to do so, but that was 
outside their authority.20 
Moore’s questions about rich Indians and poor Indians 
illustrates American anxiety about whether Indians who 
were not impoverished could still be Indian. As historian 
Alexandra Harmon noted, “When it seemed that 
Indians could also be millionaires, many people tried 
to sort out their thoughts on ambition and on Indians 
simultaneously.”21 The entire subcommittee process can 
be viewed through this lens. Throughout the testimony 
and the internal Commission meetings, Indian gaming 
and issues of whether tribes “deserved” to have gaming 
became a primary question for commissioners. They 
were intensely interested in controlling tribes through 
tighter regulations and through increased state and 
federal control over decisions related to Indian gaming. 
Whether or not commissioners favored or opposed 
gambling, with the exception of Robert Loescher, all 
of the commissioners believed tribes were somehow 
gaining unfair advantages through gaming. Lou Jones, 
head of security for the Viejas Tribe of California, a 
native Californian but not a tribal member observed, 
“I noticed you asked some questions earlier about 
rich Indians, which I thought was rather interesting. I 
have never heard anybody ask any business about rich 
owners. It seems to me that sometimes in dealing with 
Indians, if they are successful, we have a double standard 
here, and this is what is happening in California.”22
Anthropologist Katherine Spilde noted that the 
rhetoric of “rich Indians” has been used by outsiders to 
“weaken tribal claims of sovereignty on the basis that 
tribes do not need sovereign rights now that they have 
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a new economic resource (emphasis in the original).”23 
Tribes acknowledged recent economic successes 
at the same time they asserted tribal sovereignty 
and while reminding Commissioners about federal 
commitments to tribes. Stanley Crooks, Chairman 
of the Shakopee Mdewakanton Dakota community 
asserted, “Gaming has brought substantial progress, 
but it will be many years before the devastation of 
nearly 200 years can be remedied, particularly for 
larger tribes in rural areas…That is why I firmly 
believe that the Federal Government must continue 
to maintain its trust responsibility to the tribes, 
irrespective of whether gaming continues or not. Our 
Mdewakanton ancestors ceded 24 million acres of land 
and gave up a way of life in exchange for the promise of 
protection by the United States. That protection must 
be honored.”24 All tribes noted the economic impact on 
the reservations and surrounding communities, where 
even low-revenue casinos put hundreds of thousands 
of dollars into localities and states through goods 
and services purchases and through payroll taxes and 
charitable contributions. For higher revenue casinos, 
these figures soared into the millions. Critics of Indian 
gaming have noted that low-revenue casinos generate 
little for their communities, but those conclusions 
overlook the importance of tribal self-determination, 
tribal economic development, and tribal member 
pride in steady employment which feeds their families 
and their intellect. Tribes do not view gaming as a 
wealth generator, but instead as a mechanism which 
supports the real wealth: community, culture, self-
determination, and sovereignty. Put another way, 
viewing Indian gaming simply through the lens of 
economic development misses the point. And that’s 
why it was so important for the subcommittee to hear 
tribal testimony.
Stan Rice, Jr., President of the Yavapi-Prescott 
Tribe, shared his community’s story, “Today, I come 
before you to share a success story. A true story of self-
sufficiency, growth, community involvement and, most 
importantly, a story of pride…Once the recipient of 
charity and governmental support, we are now giving 
back to our community and supporting many of those 
charitable groups which once helped us…In summary, 
I pose the question, ‘What has gaming revenue done 
for the Yavapi-Prescott Tribe?’ The answer is…fulfill a 
dream. What we once thought was impossible has now 
been made possible…Now we are in a position to realize 
our dreams, to build a community, and to preserve our 
heritage.”25
Hostilities
 As tribal leaders shared meaningful accounts 
of tribal restoration and noted some of the positive 
social, cultural, and economic impacts gaming had on 
their communities, subcommittee members seemed to 
remain somewhat obtuse. As a result, tribal governments 
and individuals testifying before the subcommittee 
often felt they faced a hostile environment. Two issues 
in particular emerged as points of contention during 
the hearings: John Wilhelm’s conflict of interest and the 
Commission’s insistent requests for casino-by-casino 
tribal revenue data despite the NIGC’s response that the 
data was legislatively deemed confidential by the IGRA. 
 John Wilhelm, on behalf of the HERE Union, 
had brought five lawsuits and National Labor Relations 
Board (NLRB) proceedings against tribes. Jacob Coin, 
Executive Director of NIGA, observed that Wilhelm 
was “engaged in out-and-out warfare with Indian tribes,” 
and that it “reflect[ed] poorly on the credibility of the 
entire Commission for it not to insist that Mr. Wilhelm 
remove himself from issues and reports involving Indian 
gaming.”26 The day after the first Indian subcommittee 
hearings in San Diego, the Coalition of Northern 
California Tribes, via Priscilla Hunter (Chairperson, 
Coyote Valley Tribe) and Victor Preston (Chairman, 
Susanville Rancheria), wrote to Commission Chair Kay 
James about Wilhelm’s behavior. Hunter and Preston 
noted that the subcommittee told tribes seating was 
limited to 20, so tribes should not bring employees 
or tribal members. Upon arriving the first day, they 
discovered the hearings were actually held in a large 
room. On the second day, tribes arrived to find “the 
entire ballroom filled to over capacity with Latino 
people who were there in opposition to Proposition 
5, [California’s] Indian Gaming Initiative. They were 
wearing yellow union shirts and holding yellow “Vote 
No on 5” placards.” Hunter and Preston went on to 
say that tribal members who spoke Spanish asked the 
protestors why they were at the hearing. “The Latino 
people told the tribal members that they did not know 
why they were there. They were just told to be there 
and they would be paid. They were told to clap when 
everyone else did. And they were told NOT to speak 
with anyone (emphasis in the original).” 
Despite these interruptions, tribes continued to 
testify before the subcommittee, clearly recognizing that 
they may have few chances to illustrate the impacts of 
tribal gaming. Tribes initially felt the hearing went well, 
until, “We were outraged when, at the conclusion of the 
hearing and still within the ballroom, Commissioner 
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John Wilhelm led an anti-Indian rally with the union 
supporters, encouraging them to continue their fight 
against Indian gaming. There is no doubt in our minds 
that Commissioner Wilhelm has a severe conflict of 
interest…Commissioner Wilhelm’s display is an insult 
to the California Indian people. Did the Commission 
invite tribes to a meeting to be publicly humiliated?” 
Hunter and Preston concluded that tribes were 
willing to share information and that they expected 
to be treated with dignity and respect, and they also 
requested that any future overt bias be eliminated from 
the Commission.27 Wilhelm’s public anti-Indian bias 
was not enough to remove him from the Commission; 
he remained a member through the Commission’s end.
In addition to the conflict of interest inherent 
in seating Wilhelm on the Commission, tribes also 
had to repeatedly assert why the Commission was 
not entitled to see confidential tribal casino revenue 
and income statements. The IGRA expressly restricts 
disclosure of tribal gaming information and it requires 
the NIGC to keep all tribal information confidential. 
Timothy Wapato (Colville), former Executive Director 
of the National Indian Gaming Association, reminded 
the Commission, “The authorizing Committees in 
Congress (Senate Indian Affairs Committee and the 
House Resources Committee) have done oversight or 
examination on the effects of [the IGRA]…exceeding 
a rate of three times a year. The idea behind this 
Commission was not that Congress needed additional 
information on Indian gaming from a national 
Commission with limited experience in Indian Nation 
matters.”28 Each of the one hundred people testifying 
from their tribes addressed regulation in their 
testimony, each one describing the three or four levels 
of auditing and regulation their casinos employed, 
and despite this, the Commission chose to impugn 
tribes and sovereignty by concluding that tribes are 
“unregulated,” the very conclusion tribes and NIGA 
had feared from the beginning of the study. Keller 
George, President of the United South and Eastern 
Tribes and Chairman of the Oneida [New York] 
Indian Gaming Commission posed this question 
to the subcommittee in January 1998: “How do you 
reconcile this overwhelming body of evidence with 
the accusation that Indian gaming is unregulated? 
The answer is quite simple—when you focus on 
who is making the accusation. To the best of my 
knowledge, no state government official has suggested 
to the NGISC that the regulation of Indian gaming 
is inadequate or that there is rampant corruption on 
Indian reservations…Further, the federal government 
has not appeared before this Commission to suggest 
that organized crime has invaded Indian gaming…
The principle purveyors of the myth that Indian 
gaming is unregulated are the owners and operators 
of non-Indian casinos.” George observed that these 
owners were simply afraid of competition and that 
the motive for this misinformation was “a quest for 
monopolistic power.” George went on to say that 
outsiders who concluded that tribes were not capable 
of self-regulation expressed sentiments that were at 
best paternalistic, at worst racist. “In all events, these 
attitudes will no longer be tolerated!”29
One leader lamented, “There is, in Indian Country, 
a continuing fear of this Commission. There is concern 
that this study will fail to report the facts despite the 
many and historic efforts of Indian Nations to participate 
openly and honestly. Events have occurred during the 
life of this Commission which do not develop trust that 
this Commission is interested in the facts about Indian 
gaming.”30
Final Report 
After a year of collecting testimony from tribes, the 
subcommittee presented their findings to the whole 
Commission. Robert Loescher reminded his fellow 
commissioners that, per the IGRA, revenues from 
Indian gaming must be used for the social and economic 
impact of tribal members. “In my view, gaming is just a 
tiny down payment on the deficit of stupendous social 
and economic needs facing the vast majority of Native 
American citizens. The Commission record strongly 
supports the conclusion that the economic benefits 
under IGRA are being realized.” 31 
An early draft of the Indian Gambling Subcommittee 
report concluded, “Tribal government gaming is 
inherently problematic from a jurisdictional point of view 
since Indian affairs are primarily a Federal concern and 
gambling is historically a state one. Tribal government 
gaming has intensified tensions over Federal, state, and 
tribal jurisdiction that have existed for over 200 years.”32 
After one year of tribal testimony regarding the positive 
social, cultural, and economic impacts of tribal gaming, 
and one year of extensive discussion of the IGRA, the 
subcommittee chose to reinforce state anxieties over 
tribal sovereignty rather than use its position to explain 
tribal gaming more clearly.  At the Senate Committee 
on Indian Affairs oversight hearing on Commission’s 
final report, NIGA president Rick Hill (Oneida) 
observed that the Commission could not understand 
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tribes, “it was like Frankenstein meeting Dracula.”  No 
one on the Commission spoke the language necessary 
to understand Indian-government gaming.33 
Ultimately, the final Subcommittee on Indian 
Gambling report did not include the draft language 
and it was generally positive for tribes. It also changed 
almost nothing. The Commission’s final report included 
fifteen recommendations—the Commission had no 
authority to implement recommendations or infringe 
on tribal, federal, or state authority—ranging from 
recognizing and protecting tribal sovereignty and state 
sovereignty to acknowledging that the NIGC is the 
lead federal regulator of Indian gaming and that tribes 
must report annual gambling financial information to 
the NIGC. The recommendations encouraged tribes, 
states, and localities to continue to work together to find 
mutually beneficial solutions for local infrastructure, 
and that tribes and states should voluntarily work 
together with unions to ensure workers’ rights. The 
Commission observed that tribes and states should 
work together, rather than expecting the federal law to 
resolve issues, but at the same time, the Commission 
called for Congress to specify “a constitutionally sound 
means of resolving disputes between states and tribes 
regarding Class III gaming.”34 At last, states and tribes 
found common ground in their opposition to the 
recommended Congressional solution for tribal-state 
compacting. Tribes and states both asserted that such 
legislation would diminish their respective sovereignties 
and would eliminate the need to cooperate.35 
Tribes had spent two years educating Commissioners 
about tribal government gaming. Tribal leaders clearly 
expressed how gaming had changed the lives of their 
tribal members and how the economic impact of 
gaming provided tribes with avenues to enhance 
their political sovereignty and cultural sovereignty. 
Joseph Kalt, from the Harvard Project on American 
Indian Economic Development, told the Commission, 
“Tribal gaming operations are the epitome of self-
determination and self-government…They represent 
acts of political will, expressed through tribal members’ 
own governments.” Viewed through the continuum of 
federal Indian policy from separation to assimilation 
to self-determination, tribal gaming unquestionably 
illustrates how tribes implement their own solutions 
how little tribes need a benevolent “Great Father.” It 
is also important to reinforce that the NGISC report 
did not change anything for Indian gaming because 
tribal leaders participated in those conversations. 
Unlike removal and allotment and termination, tribal 
leaders defended tribal rights directly to the federal 
officials trying to diminish those rights. Social activist 
LaDonna Harris (Comanche) observed that tribes need 
to institutionalize self-determination. “We know that 
success depends on tribal leaders and Native activists 
being at the table before—not after—major decisions 
are made.”36 The success of Indian gaming was never 
assured, a reality which is easy to forget forty years into 
tribal gaming.37 The testimony of these tribal leaders not 
only protected tribal government gaming for one more 
day, it also advanced self-determination and reinforced 
sovereignty. 
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